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This paper presents further empirical evidence on the relationship between black market and 
official exchange rates in six emerging economies (Iran, India, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan, 
and Thailand). First, it applies both time series techniques and heterogeneous panel methods 
to test for the existence of a long-run relationship between these two types of exchange rates. 
Second, it tests formally the validity of the proportionality restriction implying a constant 
black-market premium. Third, it also analyses the short-run dynamic responses of both 
markets to shocks. Finally, it tries to shed some light on the determinants of the market 
premium. Evidence of slow reversion to the long-run equilibrium is found. Further, it appears 
that capital controls and expected currency devaluation are the two main factors affecting the 
size of the premium and determining the breakdown in the proportionality relationship. 
JEL Code: C23, F31. 






Guglielmo Maria Caporale 
Department of Economics and Finance 
Brunel University 












October 2006   1
1. Introduction 
Black markets for foreign currency develop mainly as a result of government 
restrictions on capital outflows, which induce domestic residents to seek alternative 
sources of foreign currency. Its supply generally comes from the tourist industry, 
while demand originates mainly from residents travelling abroad on holiday or to 
study. Since demand for foreign currency normally exceeds supply, suppliers are able 
to charge a higher price than the official rate. The difference between the black 
market (or parallel) exchange rate and the official rate is known as the black-market 
premium. 
  As argued in Kiguel and O`Connell (1995), a significant spread between black 
market and official rate may be a signal of macroeconomics misalignments, and 
consequently central banks will often intervene in the official market to eliminate the 
spread – hence the importance of investigating whether there exists a long-run 
relationship between black market and official exchange rates. 
1The implications are 
extremely important not only for policy-makers but also for financial managers 
investing in emerging markets and managing the exchange rate risk. In addition to the 
long-run equilibrium, it is also interesting to analyse the short-run speed of adjustment 
of the two types of exchange rates in response to external shocks.  
In this paper, we use both time series and heterogeneous panel cointegration 
tests to test for the existence of a long-run relationship between the black market and 
the official exchange rate in six emerging countries (i.e., Iran, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Pakistan, and Thailand). Moreover, we test by means of a panel Wald test the validity 
of the unity (proportionality) restriction on the cointegrating coefficient implied by 
portfolio-balance models (see, e.g., Dornbusch et al, 1983). Further, we investigate 
the short-run dynamics by estimating impulse response functions using bootstrap 
methods, and try to shed some light on the possible determinants of the market 
premium.  
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 outlines the econometric 
methodology. Section 3 contains a descriptive analysis of the data and the 
cointegration tests. Section 4 focuses on the determinants of the black market 
premium. Section 5 summarises the main findings and offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Econometric Methodology 
Let  it s and 
*
it s be the log of the black market and of the official exchange rate, 
respectively, in country i. To take into account heterogeneity, we apply the 
McCoskey and Kao (1998) panel cointegration test by specifying the following DOLS 









* φ β α    (1) 
i =1,…N,  ki = leads and lags of ∆s
*
i  
                                                           
1 Note that many studies (e.g., Booth and Mustafa, 1991) also consider this crucial to establishing 
whether or not the black market processes information efficiently (i.e. whether investors use 
information contained in the black market rate to predict movements in the official rate), though more   2
The number of leads and lags in equation (1) is chosen with the Akaike criterion. In 
the presence of significant autocorrelation, even with high orders of leads and lags, 
one should instead employ the DGLS (Dynamic Generalised Least Squares – see 
McCoskey and Kao, 1998) estimation method, together with the Newey and West 
(1994) HAC (heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) covariance estimator, 
as we do below (see Section 3). 
The method introduced by McCoskey and Kao (1998) involves a residual-
based Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis of cointegration in panel data. 
This test is a panel version of the Harris and Inder (1994) cointegration test for time 
series. McCoskey and Kao (1998) show that the standardised version of the LM 
statistic is given by: 










    (2) 
where  v u  and  v σ  are obtained by Monte Carlo simulation methods (see Table 1, 
McCoskey and Kao, 1998). 
  We also analyse the short-run dynamic adjustment of exchange rates to 
external shocks by estimating impulse response functions Let  ]' , [
*
t t t s s S = be a 
discrete time real valued vector stochastic process, and assume it follows the 
following Vector Autoregressive model of order k ;  ) (k VAR : 
 
t k t k t t t u S S S S Β + Π + + Π + Π + Π = − − − ... 2 2 1 1 0      ... 2 , 1 = t  (3) 
 
where  t u is a  1 × p vector of error terms having a martingale specification with 
covariance matrix Ω. 
  In a more compact form (3) can be written as follows: 
 




pL L L L Π − − Π − Π − Π ≡ Π ... ) (
2
2 1 0 , with Lbeing a lag operator. 
  A Vector Moving Average (VMA) representation of (3) is: 
 
t t u L C S ) ( =        ( 5 )  
 
where 
1 ) ( ) (
− Π = L L C ; ... ) ( ) (
2
2 1 L C L C L C + + Ι = , and  ) (L C is a polynomial matrix 
generally of infinite order. 
Let  i kl, φ be the response of the variable k to a standard deviation shock on the 
variable l, iperiods ahead, and define as  , ]' ,..., [ 2 , 1 p Π Π Π = ϕ  a vector that stacks the 
parameters of the system in (3). Impulse responses are obtained by inverting the 
polynomial (3), therefore  i kl, φ  is a non-linear function of  ' ϕ such that  ) ( , ϕ φ i kl . 
Because of its non-linearity, in small samples  i kl, φ  can be biased, with the bias 
increasing with the length of the horizon. For this reason, confidence intervals should 
also be constructed. Different methods have been suggested. In this paper we follow 
                                                                                                                                                                      
recently it has been shown that the concepts of efficient markets and cointegration are independent of 
one another (see, e.g., Lence and Falk, 2005).    3




3. Descriptive Analysis and Cointegration Tests 
We use monthly data on black market and official exchange rates for six emerging 
market economies, namely Iran, India, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan and Thailand, for 
the period 1973M1-1998M1. The former series are obtained from Pick`s World 
Currency Yearbook (various issues). In this respect, our study differs from earlier 
ones focusing on individual countries (see, e.g., Booth and Mustafa, 1991), or using 
annual data covering a shorter period (see, e.g., Bahmani-Oskooee et al, 2002) 
  Table 1 shows the black-market premium for the six exchange rates being 
analysed. As can be seen, it is sizeable in the case of Iran. This might suggest that, de 
facto, Iran has a different type of exchange rate regime from the other countries in the 
sample. 
 
            Black-Market Premium (ABMP %) 1973-1998 
Country   ABMP   
Iran  662.09    
India  13.96    
Indonesia 5.613    
Korea  4.69    
Pakistan  15.07    
Thailand  0.14    
Table 1 
Note: the ABMP has been calculated as  100 * ) 1 * / ( − S S  dividing the 
black market exchange rate by the official exchange rate.  
 
As pointed out by Ghei and Kamin (1996), the level of the black market premium has 
decreased, on average, in most of the countries with black market exchange rates. 
Their analysis is based on annual data and ends in the early 1990s. Similar results are 
found at a monthly frequency for our set of countries, over a longer time period, 




% Premium Over Different 
Subsamples        
Country/Yrs  1973/1978 1979/1983 1984/1988 1989/1993 1994/1998 
IRAN  3.7 263.3 876.8 21.3 165.4 
INDIA  16.13 17.71 18.36 12.5 4.7 
INDONESIA  3.5 3.9 9.8 8.7 2.5 
KOREA  5.02 9.9 5.3 2.4 0.7 
PAKISTAN  22.03 29.6 8.4 7.6 6.4 
THAILAND  0.3 0.3 1.9 2.1 1.2 
Table 2 
 
As can be seen the size of the premium, on average, has generally decreased, in some 
cases substantially (e.g., in India, Korea, and Pakistan), which is prima facie evidence 
                                                           
2 Note that, in order to deal with the non-stationarity of the variables, we estimate a Vector Error 
Correction model, save the residuals and use a re-sampling scheme on the residuals and equation (3) to 
generate bootstrap samples (see Li and Maddala, 1997).   4
that in these countries official and black market exchange rate markets are becoming 
integrated.  
The sample period considered in Table 2 includes both periods when exchange 
controls are in place, and therefore parallel markets exist, and periods when markets 
are unified. By contrast, Table 3 reports the size of the average premium only for the 
latter case. Following Ghei and Kamin (1996), we consider markets to be unified if 
the absolute value of the difference between the black market and official market 
exchange rates is less than 3 per cent for at least twelve months. We identify only one 
such period in Iran and India, three in Indonesia and Thailand, and two in Korea. 
None are found in the case of Pakistan.  
 
   % Premium In Periods With Unified Markets    
Country        
IRAN 0.82  (1974M1-1976M8)      
INDIA 0.86  (1994M4-1995M6)      
INDONESIA 0.98  (1979M3-1980M10) 1.05 (1989M6-1991M1) 0.2 (1993M12-1997M6) 
KOREA 0.7  (1989M7-1990M7) 0.81  (1994M6-1997 M9)    
PAKISTAN N/A       
THAILAND 1.4  (1987M5-1988M9) 0.9  (1991M4-1992M7) 0.6 (1994M1-1997M4) 
Table 3 
 
We then apply panel unit root tests to test for stationarity of the black market 
and official exchange rates. Taylor and Sarno (1998) propose a panel unit root test for 
the joint null hypothesis of nonstationarity The test is based on the Johansen maximum 
likelihood method for multivariate cointegration, where the null hypothesis is that at 
least one of the series in the panel has a unit root, H0: rank (Π) < N. The null is rejected 
if and only if all the series in the panel are stationary processes, i.e. H1: rank(Π) = N, 
where the matrix Π denotes the long-run solution of the VAR system for N variables. 
This is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis that the smallest eigenvalue of Π, λmin, is 
non-zero, which is done using Johansen's likelihood ratio statistic (JLR),  
 
 
) 1 ln( min λ − − = T JLR      ( 6 )  
  
 
Taylor and Sarno (1998) show that the JLR statistic has a limiting χ
2(1) distribution 
under the null hypothesis. The results of the JLR test are reported in Table 4, and 
confirm that both types of exchange rates are  ) 1 ( I processes, as usually found in the 
empirical literature. 
   5
Taylor and Sarno (1998)’s JLR Panel Unit Root Test 
  JLR statistic 
t s   0.110556 
*
t s   0.123574 
       Table 4 
        Note: The 5% critical value is 3.9712 (Taylor and Sarno, 1998, Table 3). 
 
Next, we test for cointegration between the two exchange rates
3. Booth and 
Mustafa (1991) inter alia argue that the existence of cointegration is inconsistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis, which implies that past information on the exchange 
rate cannot be exploited to forecast future values: a feedback from one market to the 
other would constitute evidence of weak-form informational inefficiency in the black 
market. However, more recently it has been shown that market efficiency and 
cointegration are not incompatible (see, e.g., Lence and Falk, 2005).  
 
McCoskey and Kao (1998)’s Panel Cointegration Test  
Country Leads/Lags AR(ρ) Pr[Fa]  Harris and Inder 
CointegrationTest 
Iran 1 1  12.15  0.0787 
India 2  1  10.39  0.1286 
Indonesia 7  2  6.77  0.1506 
Korea 8  2  15.58  0.2921 
Pakistan 1  1 8.88 0.1313 
Thailand 7  1  14.35  0.3689 
McCoskey-Kao panel test 
(LM
*) 
   0.56 
CV-5%       1.64 
Table 5 
Note: (a) The critical values for the Harris and Inder cointegration test (for time series with 1 
regressor) are: 1%=0.5497; 5%=0.3202 (Harris and Inder, 1994, Table 1). (b) The LM
* test is one-
sided with a critical value of 1.64 (i.e. LM*>1.64 implies rejection of the null hypothesis of 
cointegration).  
 (c) Pr[Fa] is the probability value of an F0 version of the Breusch-Godfrey test for 9
th order 
autocorrelation. AR(ρ) denotes the order of the autoregressive  scheme employed in the model. 
 
Table 5 reports two cointegration tests, specifically the McCoskey and Kao 
(1998) panel cointegration test, and the univariate cointegration tests due to Harris 
and Inder (1994),  which is a time series version of it. Looking at the individual 
cointegration tests, we note that there is evidence of cointegration in all countries. The 
                                                           
3 Note that, in a high inflation country, if the two exchange rates are unrelated to each other but move 
proportionately to the differential between the domestic and foreign price level, they will depreciate at 
a similar pace, which could lead to spurious cointegration. We have addressed this issue by deflating 
the black market and official exchange rates by the relative price levels, and by performing 
cointegration tests on the real exchange rates. The results, which are available on request, were 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3 and 4, suggesting that the cointegration we find 
between nominal rates is not spurious.   6
panel cointegration test also confirms that there exists a long-run relationship between 
the two exchange rates.  
  Table 6 presents DGLS estimates of the cointegrating vector. As can be seen, 
all the coefficients are statistically significant (at least at the 10% confidence level), 
with the exception of the intercept for Thailand. The extremely small coefficient on 
the  β parameter for Iran might be seen as further confirmation that the Iranian 
exchange rate regime is different from the others. 
4 
Portfolio-balance models are frequently used to provide an economic 
interpretation of the relationship between the two types of exchange rates (see, e.g., 
Dornbusch et al, 1983). They assert that asset market conditions determine the black 
market rate, and the current account affects it through the stock of black-market 
foreign currency. Consequently, there is a proportional equilibrium relationship 
between the two rates (with the black-market rate depreciating at same rate as the 
official rate in the long run), which implies that the long-run parameter β  should be 
equal to unity, resulting in a constant black-market premium. Consider, for instance, 
the case of an anticipated devaluation of the official rate. In the short run, the black 
market rate overshoots, as demand for black foreign currency increases but the supply 
of foreign currency is fixed, i.e. the premium rises as a result of an anticipated 
devaluation; however, the higher premium gradually leads to a current account 
surplus and an excess supply of foreign currency (since flow supply increases whilst 
flow demand decreases owing to a higher premium). This triggers off a decline in the 
premium, which gradually reverts to its long-run value, implying that in the long run 
the change in the black market rate is proportional to that in the official rate. In the 
Dornbusch et al, 1983 model, portfolio preferences are assumed to be constant. 
However, it is conceivable that they might shift, which would widen the premium. In 
such a case, the cointegrating coefficient would change over time and become 
different from the unity value implied by standard portfolio-balance models. To 
investigate this issue, we test the proportionality restriction by means of a Wald test 
(see Table 6).  
 
                DGLS Estimates (Equation 1) 
 
Country 





















Korea  1.16 
[2.12] 
0.83 











                                                           
4 Two types of regimes are likely to characterise the countries analysed in this paper. In the first, 
widespread controls on a broad range of transactions may force many current account as well as capital 
account transactions onto the black market; then leakages between the markets (for example, as agents 
take foreign exchange acquired in the official market and resell it in the black market) might result in 
relatively strong linkages between the official and black market exchange rates. In the second (e.g., 
Iran), the official exchange rate is fixed and allowed to become so overvalued that few transactions 
take place at that rate, with most of the transactions taking place illicitly at the black market rate; in this 
situation, the official exchange rate might have a smaller influence on the black market rate.   7
PLR    52.66 
CV-1%    16.81 
CV-5%    12.59 
Table 6 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below the regression coefficients are t-values. χ
2(1) is 
the Wald test for the proportionality restriction, H0:β=1 (5% CV=3.84). PLR is the 
corresponding panel likelihood ratio statistic that follows a χ
2(v) distribution with 
N(=6) d.f . 
As in Cerrato and Sarantis (2003), we also extend this test to a panel context.  
The null hypothesis of a valid restriction is accepted in the case of Thailand and 
Indonesia, whilst it is strongly rejected in all the other cases. The panel test confirms 
that the proportionality restriction cannot be accepted for the panel under 
investigation. This could be the result of shifts in portfolio preferences, or perhaps of 
the imposition of foreign exchange and/or capital controls. By contrast, Bahmani-
Oskooee et al (2002) report in their study that in the long run full adjustment takes 
place. However, these authors base their claim simply on point estimates (close to 
one) of the long-run slope coefficient, and unlike us do not carry out any statistical 
tests of the relevant restriction. 
5 On the basis of these findings, we can conclude that 
black market and official exchange rates are linked in the long run, though the 
empirical evidence seems also to suggest that the black-market premium is unlikely to 
disappear even in the long run.  
  Finally, we investigate the short-run dynamic adjustment between the two 
types of exchange rates. Figures 1-6 show impulse responses to a unit standard 
deviation shock to either exchange rate. The empirical results appear to confirm the 
positive significant impact of the official exchange rate on the black market exchange 
rate. Furthermore, they are consistent with the sign of theβ -coefficient estimated by 
DGLS. 
We also examine the response of each exchange rate to shocks to the same 
market. These show that both the official and the black market exchange rates are 
highly persistent processes
6. However, in general, the speed of response to a unit 
standard deviation shock seems to be higher for the black market exchange rate 
compared to the official one. 
On the whole, we observe the short-run overshooting predicted by portfolio-
balance models. However, we also find that, even after forty months, the effects of 
shocks have not died away, which is inconsistent with the long-run full adjustment 
implied by this class of models.
7 It would appear, therefore, that the long-run black-
market premium is not constant, or, at least, that deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium are long-lived, with long memory characterising these processes (see 
Granger and Joyeux, 1980). 
 
                
                                                           
5 Some single-country studies test formally the long-run proportionality restriction, and cannot reject it 
(see, e.g., Kouretas and Zarangas, 2001). 
6 We tested for stationarity of the individual exchange rates and found that, with the exception of 
Korea, they were all non-stationary. This might explain their persistence which is shown by the 
impulse responses. 
7 This result is in line with Cerrato and Sarantis (2004), who report point estimates of half-lives 
deviations of the exchange rate from PPP ranging, for some of these countries, between 0.22 years and 
infinity, while the upper bounds of the confidence intervals were in all cases infinite.   8
 
Figure 1: Iran; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
 
Figure 2: India; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
 
Figure 3: Indonesia; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
   9
 
Figure 4: Korea; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
 
Figure 5: Pakistan; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
 
Figure 6: Thailand; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
 
4.  Inflation, Capital Controls, Expected Currency Devaluation and the Black 
Market Premium  
 
The analysis of the previous section has shown that, although official and black 
market exchange rates are cointegrated, the proportionality restriction implied by the   10
Dornbusch et al, 1983 model is unlikely to hold. In this section we try to shed further 
light on this issue and to identify some reasons why this might be the case. 
  Following Ghei and Kamin (1996), we calculate some simple ratios of black 
market to official real exchange rate over different periods (i.e. with unified and not 
unified markets). The equilibrium real exchange rate (RER) is defined as the real 
official exchange rate averaged over the entire sample. We first compare the ratio of 
the black market exchange rate to RER over the full sample. The mean, reported at 
the bottom of Table 7, suggests that the black market exchange rate appreciated more 
than the official one over that period. This might account for the existence of a 
significant premium, in line with results presented in Table 1. However, this sample 
includes both periods when capital controls were in place and periods when they were 
not. Next, we focus only on periods of unified markets (i.e. when capital controls 
were not in place). In this case, the black market rate is found to be much closer to the 
long-run equilibrium exchange rate, and the market premium is now very small. 
Therefore, it appears that the market premium can change over time owing to factors 
such as the imposition of capital controls. 
 
Table 7: Main Ratios Indicators 
        
  Country/Ratios                         eb/e          eb/eu     
 IRAN  3.6 1.02    
 INDIA  1.13 1    
 INDONESIA  1.06 1    
 KOREA  1.04 1    
  PAKISTAN  1.13           N/A   
 THAILAND  1 1    
 Mean  1.493333 1.004    
        
              Note: eb is the black market real exchange rate for the entire  
              period. 
              e is the official real exchange rate for the entire period.   
              eu is the official real exchange rate during periods of unified  
              markets. 
 
These findings might be useful to interpret the panel results on the proportionality 
restriction reported in the previous section: they highlight the importance of capital 
controls in explaining the risk premium and the appreciation of black market 
exchange rates relative to their long-run equilibrium level. 
We also examine other factors that might affect the premium and lead to a 
breakdown in the proportionality relationship implied by the model due to Dornbusch 
et al (1983). Specifically, we model the risk premium (P) as a function of inflation (I), 
expected devaluation (E), and dummy variables to account for capital controls (D). As 
a measure of expected depreciation we use the 10-year bond yield differential 
between the domestic country and the US. The inflation rate is constructed using the 
consumer price index (CPI), and a capital controls dummy variable, which takes the 
value of one when markets are not unified and zero otherwise, is also included. These 
additional data are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. The 
adopted model specification allows for k lags (up to eleven) of inflation and/or 
expected depreciation, but we only report estimates (and standard errors) for the last 
selected lag in the regression, as in the following equation: 
 
   11
 
 
t t k t k t t t t u D a E a I a E a I a a P + + + + + + = − − 5 4 3 2 1 0     (7) 
 
 




Table 8: Regression Estimates 
 
                   
   0 a   1 a   2 a   3 a   4 a     5 a   
Adj.R-
squared 
India  12.88*  0.12  0.83*  -0.12*  1.12*    1.4    0.4 
  
                
[1.30] 
        
[0.9] 
             
[0.519] 
       
[0.04] 
       
[0.49]    [1.30] 
Korea   0.24  0.33  0.25  -0.11*   0.3*    2.68*    0.3 
  
       
[0.30] 
        
[1.1] [0.6] 
       
[0.07] 
       
[0.09]    [0.87] 
Thailand   1.05*   0.5   -0.22*   0.05*   1.1*  -1.29*    0.35 
  
     
[0.025] 
      
[0.87] 
             
[0.08] 
     
[0.025] 
        
[0.7]    [0.39] 
 
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors.     
The asterisk indicates that variable is significant at the 10% level     
 
It can be seen that the lags of inflation and expected devaluation are all significant, 
with the latter having the correct sign (i.e. positive, indicating that an expected 
devaluation increases the premium). A rise in inflation is found to lower the premium 
in the case of India and Korea, whilst the opposite is true in the case of Thailand. The 
dummy variable is significant only for Korea and Thailand, and with the expected 
sign only in the latter case. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides further empirical evidence on the relationship between black 
market and official exchange rates in six emerging economies (Iran, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Pakistan, and Thailand). First, it applies both time series techniques and 
heterogeneous panel methods to test for the existence of a long-run relation between 
these two types of exchange rates. Second, it tests formally the validity of the 
proportionality restriction implying a constant black-market premium (unlike other 
studies, such as Bahmani-Oskooee et al, 2002, only reporting point estimates). Third, 
in addition to the long-run equilibrium, it also analyses the short-run dynamic 
responses of both markets to shocks. Finally, it investigates the determinant of the 
market premium.  Our empirical analysis suggests that black market and official rates 
are linked in the long run. However, unlike other authors (e.g., Kouretas and 
Zarangas, 2001), we also find that the proportionality restriction, which is an essential 
feature of portfolio-balance models (see Dornbusch et al, 1983), is rejected, indicating 
that the adjustment towards equilibrium in response to short-run shocks is incomplete. 
Partial reversion to the long-run equilibrium (or possibly the presence of long-
                                                           
8 Owing to limited availability of data on bond yields we estimate this regression for fewer countries 
and over a shorter sample, specifically for India (1973M10-1990M12), Korea (1973M5-1988M12), 
and Thailand (1979M12-1988M12).   12
memory features) is confirmed by the short-run analysis, showing that the initial 
overshooting does not totally fade away. Further, as in Ghei and Kamin (1996), 
capital controls and expected currency devaluation are found to have a positive impact 
on the size of the premium, whilst there is weaker evidence of an impact of inflation. 
Therefore, it appears that the first two factors might be responsible for the breakdown 
in the proportionality relationship implied by portolio-balance models such as the one 
of Dornbusch et al (1983). 
These results have important implication for both fund managers and policy-
makers. The existence of international arbitrage opportunities suggests that the former 
can reduce exchange rate risk knowing that fluctuations in the black market rate 
signal corresponding adjustments in the official rate However, the exchange rate risk 
cannot be eliminated altogether, as full adjustment does not take place (or is 
extremely slow), and a widening gap between the two exchange rates is only partially 
closed (at least over a relevant investment horizon). Permanent (or long-lived) 
deviations from equilibrium also imply that monetary authorities can effectively 
pursue their policy objectives by imposing foreign exchange or direct controls (see 
Kiguel and O’Connell, 1995), not having to adjust the official rate to the market-
determined parallel one in order to close the gap between the two (at least for a 
considerable time) – a crucial policy implication. This is in stark contrast to the study 
of Bahmani-Oskooee et al (2002), where proportionality is found though not formally 
tested.    13
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